Do we have reasons to do as we believe we ought to do? by Fink, J. (Julian)
  
 
DO WE HAVE REASONS TO DO AS WE BELIEVE WE OUGHT 
TO DO?* 
 
Julian Fink 
Oxford University 
 
 
 
Suppose you believe you ought to p. Does your failure to p imply that you 
are not entirely as you ought to be? Ought you to p if you believe you to 
ought to p? This paper argues for a qualified version of this claim. It is qua-
lified in two ways. First, I assume that this can be so only if ‘if you believe 
you ought to p’ appears within the scope of ‘you ought’. That is, you ought to 
[if you believe you ought to p, then p.] Second, I argue that you ought to do 
as you believe you ought to only as far as it goes; that is, unless there are 
exceptional reasons not to do so. In this sense, we have a pro tanto reason to 
do as we believe we ought to do. 
My argument for this claim relies on two major premises: (i) you have a 
normative reason to discard any belief that you ought to p if it is not the case 
that you ought to p; (ii) if you have a reason to p or you have a reason to q, 
then you have a reason to (p or q). I defend (i) against a number of views in 
epistemology which exclude that the falsity of a normative proposition can be 
a reason not to believe this proposition. I argue agglomeration as in (ii) does 
not lead to the paradoxical results ascribed to it. After my defense of (i) and 
(ii) I show how these two premises entail the conclusion that we have a 
normative reason [to p if we believe we ought to p]. 
 
* * * 
 
Suppose rationality requires us to do as we believe we ought to do. Are we 
only irrational in not satisfying this requirement? Or is it that we are also not 
                                                                            
*  The present paper is an adapted version of a longer paper, suitable for a 30 minutes conference 
presentation. 
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entirely as we ought to be? Do we have normative reasons to do what we 
believe we ought to do?  
Most philosophers just take this for granted. You ought to do as rationality 
requires you to do. So, if rationality requires you to do as you believe you 
ought to do, then you ought to do what you believe you ought to do. For some 
this just follows a priori, assuming that ‘being rational’ is just synonymous 
with ‘being as one ought to be’. 
Others hold that, though not having the same meaning, being rationally 
required to behave in a particular way implies necessarily that you ought to 
behave so. James Dreier even contends that ‘there is no sense at all to be ma-
de of the question of whether we have any reason to follow the rules of ra-
tionality’1. He think that normative reasons, ought, and rationality are so inti-
mately connected that asking this question would be like asking ‘if you ought 
to p, ought you to p?’, which admittedly makes no sense. It is simply 
unthinkable that ‘rationality requires you’ does not entail ‘you ought to’. 
But it is not unthinkable. Two examples immediately reveal why. Suppose 
rationality requires you to p if you believe you ought to p. Also, suppose you 
believe that you ought to p. Is it true now that you ought to p? Clearly not. 
For this would imply that your ‘ought beliefs’ could never be false. They 
would make themselves true. Yet, this is surely implausible. There are false 
normative beliefs. Suppose you believe you ought to extinguish all mankind. 
In almost all conceivable situations, this will be false. Furthermore, suppose 
that an evil dictator withdraws from her attempt to extinguish all mankind 
only if you manage not to do what you believe you ought to do. In this situa-
tion, very plausibly, you ought not to do what you believe you ought to do; 
hence, you ought to be irrational. 
Nonetheless, this paper argues for a qualified version of the claim that we 
ought to p if we believe we ought to p. My argument for this relies on two 
major premises: (i) that you have a reason not to believe that you ought to if it 
is not the case that you ought to; (ii) if you have a reason to p or you have a 
reason to q, then you have a reason to [p or q]. 
In the following I defend (i) and (ii) against putative objections. In parti-
cular, I defend (i) against ‘exclusive’ versions of evidentialism and teleology 
which both imply that the falsity of a normative proposition is no reason not 
to believe this proposition. Furthermore, I defend (ii) by showing that by 
agglomerating two disjunctively connected reasons to a disjunction governed 
                                                                            
1  J. DREIER, ‘Humean doubts’, p. 29. 
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by a reason does not lead to paradoxical results. I show how (i) and (ii) entail 
that we have a normative reason [to p if we believe we ought to p]. 
Ought, reasons, and normative falsehoods 
Suppose you believe that you ought to p. Do you now have a reason for 
bringing about that p? Or is it even that you ought to p? As pointed out in the 
introduction, if understood pre-theoretically, the answer to (at least) the last 
question must be ‘no’. Otherwise our normative beliefs would make them-
selves true. But this is clearly implausible. There are false normative beliefs, 
as I have shown above.  
However, there is another way to understand the question of whether we 
ought to do what we believe we ought to do. Suppose it is not the case that 
[rationality requires you to p]2 whenever you believe you ought to p. Instead 
rationality requires you to avoid situations in which you believe that you 
ought to p without brining it about that you p. In other words, it requires you 
either to bring about that p or not to believe that you ought to p. This means 
that you can satisfy this requirement either by bringing about p or by ceasing 
to believe that you ought to p. Assuming that you ought to satisfy this ‘wide-
scope’ requirement then no longer implies that your normative beliefs can 
never be false. All it would tell you is that you ought to avoid believing that 
you ought to p without brining about that p. In other words, you ought to [if 
you believe you ought to p, then p]3. 
I have defended the wide-scope reading of the requirements of rationality 
elsewhere, but due to limited space, I cannot repeat my argument here. I will 
just assume that the wide-scope reading represents the correct logical form of 
the requirement. This opens up the possibility that we have a reason to [if we 
believe we ought to p, then p]. 
I now come to my argument for this claim. First, consider two premises. 
 
O(p) v ¬O(p), 
 
                                                                            
2  The brackets are used to show that ‘rationality requires’ only governs ‘you to p’ and does not 
include ‘whenever you believe you ought to p’. 
3  I owe the wide-scope interpretation of the requirements of rationality to John Broome. In par-
ticular, see his ‘Normative requirements’, his ‘Are intentions reasons?’, and his ‘Reasons’. For 
an earlier interpretation of the wide-scope form of requirements, see Jonathan Dancy’s ‘The lo-
gical conscience’. 
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where ‘O’ stands for ‘you ought to’, ‘p’ for a proposition, ‘v’ for the logical 
disjunction, ‘¬’ for the negation, ‘→’ for the material conditional, and ‘B’ for 
‘you believe that’. I take (1) to be trivially true. It is the law of the excluded 
middle applied to normative propositions. 
In contrast to (1), the second premise of my argument is not trivially true. 
Suppose it is not the case that you ought to p, but you believe that you ought 
to p. What should be your attitude towards this belief? Retain it or discard it? 
Mark Platts answers this question as follows: “(F)alsity is a decisive failing in 
a belief, and false beliefs should be discarded; beliefs should be changed to fit 
with the world”4. 
Following Platts’s idea, the second premise of my argument says that you 
ought to discard your normative belief if it is false: 
 
(2) ¬O(p) → O¬B(O(p))5 
 
(2) assigns an ‘ought’ to ‘not having a normative belief’ on the basis of a 
property of the content of your belief. However, other normative theories use 
other features to determine whether or not you ought to have it. (2) may very 
well conflict with these views. One view that clearly conflicts with (2) is 
what I call ‘conclusive teleology’. Conclusive teleology assigns an ‘ought’ to 
‘not having a normative belief’ not on the basis of some features of the be-
lief’s content. Instead, you ought not to have a normative belief if being in 
this state of believing is relevantly beneficial. For normative beliefs, conclu-
sive teleology can roughly be defined as follows: 
 
                                                                            
4  M. PLATTS, Ways of Meaning, p. 256; original emphasis. 
5  Note that (2) should not be confused with two similar principles, (2a) and (2b):  
 (2a) ¬O(p) → O(B(¬O(p)) 
 (2b) ¬O(p) → ¬O(B(O(p)) 
 (2a) says that if it is not the case that you ought to p, then you ought to believe that it is not the 
case that you ought to. Unless conjoined with a principle that you ought not [to believe that 
you ought to p and that it is not the case that you ought to p] (simultaneously), (2a), unlike (2), 
does not require you to rid yourself of any belief that you ought to p if it is not the case that 
you ought to p. It tells you to disbelieve that you ought to p if this is not the case. (2b) says that 
if it is not the case that you ought to p then it is not the case that you ought to believe that you 
ought to p. Unless conjoined with the principle that for every normative proposition N, you 
either ought to believe N or you ought not to believe N, (2b), unlike (2), does not tell you to 
discard your beliefs in normative falsehoods. Instead, it just says that it is not the case that you 
ought to believe it. 
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Conclusive teleology. Necessarily, if believing that you ought to p is 
sufficiently beneficial (in the relevant sense)6, then you ought to be-
lieve that you ought to p. 
 
I call this view ‘teleology’ because it determines whether you ought to 
believe a normative proposition on the basis of the benefits of believing it. It 
is a ‘conclusive’ version of teleology because being relevantly beneficial 
suffices to ensure that there is a conclusive reason to believe something, as 
opposed to there being merely a pro tanto reason. By ‘conclusive reason’ I 
mean a consideration that explains why you ought to do something which, 
unlike a ‘pro tanto reason’, could not be overridden by other reasons. I add 
‘necessarily’ to the formula to show that the conditional states a genuine en-
tailment, and not only a coincidental connection7. 
Here is a plausible example of when the benefits of a normative belief 
determine that you ought to have it. Suppose that an eccentric millionaire 
offers to donate £1 million to UNICEF if you manage to genuinely believe 
that you ought to fly to the moon. But it is not the case that you ought to fly 
to the moon. Suppose you have an obligation to pick up your son from school 
and that this is incompatible with you flying to the moon. Nevertheless, 
assuming that you can believe that you ought to fly to the moon, conclusive 
teleology then implies that you ought to believe that you ought to fly to the 
moon —even though this is not the case. This means that (2) must be wrong. 
The second view (2) conflicts with is ‘conclusive evidentialism’. Roughly, 
this view defines roughly as follows: 
 
Conclusive evidentialism. Necessarily, if there is conclusive evidence 
that you ought to p, then you ought to believe that you ought to p. 
 
This view is obviously a version of evidentialism because it defines a 
strong link between evidence for a normative proposition and you being 
normatively required to believe it. It is a ‘conclusive’ version of evidentialism 
                                                                            
6  I add ‘in the relevant sense’ to imply that your normative belief must be beneficial a particular 
way that contributes to determining what you ought to belief, all things considered. Further, I 
add ‘sufficiently’ to indicate some quantitative degree of being beneficial. For instance, being 
marginally beneficial may not suffice to ensure that you ought to have a normative belief. 
There may be other considerations that override the beneficial effects of your belief. 
7  Unless specified otherwise, this is the reasons for why I will add ‘necessarily’ to my other for-
mulas too. 
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because conclusive evidence for a normative belief provides a conclusive 
reason to believe a normative proposition. 
Conclusive evidentialism entails that sometimes it will be the case that you 
ought to believe that you ought to p, even if it is not the case that you ought to 
p. This will be so if there is conclusive (yet misleading) evidence for the truth 
of ‘you ought to p’. If so, you ought to retain or form a belief that you ought 
to p even though it is false. Hence, (2) cannot be correct. 
To save space, let me just assume conclusive teleology or conclusive 
evidentialism show that (2) to be false. I am sure this is so. Therefore, I need 
a modified version of (2) that is consistent with conclusive teleology and evi-
dentialism. Here is my new version of (2): 
 
(2*) ¬O(p) → R¬(B(O(p)), 
 
where ‘R’ stands for ‘you have a pro tanto reason’. (2*) says that if it is not 
the case that you ought to p then you have a reason not to believe that you 
ought to p. Unlike (2), (2*) is compatible with conclusive teleology and con-
clusive evidentialism. You may have a pro tanto reason to loose your belief 
that you ought to p even if, all benefits and evidence considered, you ought to 
retain it. 
Before I come to discuss (2*), let me just state two general assumptions 
which, due to its length, I cannot argue for in this paper8. First, I simply 
assume that in (2*), ‘R’ is meant to represent a normative reason for not ha-
ving a belief. However, one might argue that, though the falsity of N gives 
you ‘a reason’ not to believe N, the type of reason it gives you (epistemic, 
prudential, teleological, etc.) is not genuinely normative. Nevertheless, I will 
just assume if the falsity of N gives you a reason not to believe, this reason is 
genuinely normative. 
However, assuming that ‘R’ in (2*) represents a normative reason forces 
me to make another assumption which I cannot justify here. I will just assume 
that in every possible world in which (i) it is not case that you ought to p and 
(ii) there is no (overriding) reason to believe you ought to p, you can not-
believe that you ought to p. This assumption is necessary since the nor-
mativity of ‘R’ in (2*) entails that you ought not to believe that you ought to 
p in every possible world where both (i) and (ii) obtains. So, if ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’, (i) and (ii) must also imply that you can not-believe that you 
                                                                            
8  I discuss these two assumption in the long version of this paper. 
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ought to p. However, on a first view, (i) and (ii) do not seem to imply that; 
yet I will simply assume that they do. 
I now turn to some more specific objections against (2*). These objections 
entail that the falsity of a proposition is simply no reason not to believe it. 
The following two views enforce this objection. I will call these views ‘ex-
clusive teleology’ and ‘exclusive evidentialism’. Applied to normative be-
liefs, exclusive teleology is defined as follows: 
 
Exclusive teleology. Necessarily, you have a reason not to believe that 
you ought to p only if not believing that you ought to p is beneficial 
(in the relevant sense). 
 
Exclusive teleology says that only teleological considerations count in 
determining whether you ought to discard a normative belief. By assuming 
that it is not necessarily beneficial (in the relevant sense) to discard a false 
normative belief, exclusive teleology shows that (2*) cannot be correct. The 
falsehood of a normative belief is no reason not to believe it. 
 
Applied to normative propositions, exclusive evidentialism defines as fo-
llows: 
 
Exclusive evidentialism. Necessarily, you have a reason not to believe 
that you ought to p only if there is evidence that it is not the case that 
you ought to p. 
 
Exclusive evidentialism says that only evidential considerations count as 
reasons for losing a normative belief. Unless you suppose that the falsehood 
of normative proposition itself counts as evidence for not believing it, exclu-
sive evidentialism refutes (2*) straightaway. The falsity of a normative pro-
position does not give you a reason not to believe it. Only evidence for the 
falsity of a normative proposition does so. 
I think both ‘exclusive’ versions of teleology and evidentialism are 
incorrect. They therefore fail to refute (2*). In fact, I have already given a 
counterexample to exclusive evidentialism. The fact that the eccentric 
millionaire’s offer to give £1 million to UNICEF implies that you ought to 
believe a normative falsehood shows that evidential considerations are not the 
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only reasons for believing something. Teleological considerations are also 
reasons. 
However, why are teleological considerations not the only considerations 
counting in favour of believing something? I can only appeal to the intuition 
here that beliefs have a certain standard of correctness, and that this standard 
relates to the content of a belief and not to the state of believing. If this con-
tent-related standard is normative, as many philosophers argue9, it implies 
that you have a normative reason to form or modify your beliefs so that they 
fulfil the standard of correctness. Whatever the relevant standard of correct 
belief may be (truth, justification, or a combination of both, i.e. (arguably) 
knowledge, etc.) it will imply that teleological consideration are not the only 
considerations that count for or against believing something10. 
So far, I have shown that (2*) is compatible with conclusive evidentialism 
and conclusive teleology. Furthermore, I argued that exclusive teleology and 
exclusive evidentialism do not threaten the truth of (2*)? But what is the 
positive evidence for (2*)? Why should we accept it? I think there are three 
potential ways of defending (2*). 
The first defence comes from a weak version of evidentialism. Suppose 
that possessing evidence for the truth a of normative proposition N counts as 
a reason for believing N. Suppose also that one condition for this to be so is 
that we have a reason for believing N if N is true. Then it would follow that 
we have a reason to believe N if N —which arguable leads to a reason not to 
believe N if ¬N; hence (2*). 
The key part of this argument can be formulated as follows. 
 
(3a) E(O(p)) → R(B(O(p))) 
and  (3b) (E(O(p)) → R(B(O(p)))) → (O(p) → R(B(O(p)))). 
So,  (3c) O(p) → R(B(O(p))). 
So,  (2*) ¬O(p) → R¬(B(O(p))), 
 
where ‘E’ stands for ‘you have evidence that’. 
                                                                            
9  See, for example, Allan Gibbard’s ‘Thoughts and norms’; Ralph Wedgwood’s ‘The aim of be-
lief’. 
10  This is so because ‘being beneficial (in the relevant sense)’ is a state-related and not a conten-
trelated aspect of a belief. 
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In a nutshell, this argument derives (2*) from the fact that a particular 
version of evidentialism (3a) presupposes the truth of (2*). Should we accept 
this argument? One way to dismiss it would be to deny the truth of eviden-
tialism. Evidence does not give us reasons to believe something. Yet in 
showing that exclusive teleology is incorrect I already accepted this version 
of evidentialism, and I will continue to do so. Also, one could doubt that the 
inference from (3c) to (2*) is incorrect. This is so because it presupposes that 
if you have a reason to believe that it is not the case that you ought to p, then 
you have a reason not to believe that you ought to p. These two reasons may 
sometimes come apart, however. Nevertheless, for explorative purposes, I 
will accept it too. Hence, the question becomes why (3b) is correct. The idea 
behind (3b) is the following. Asking why one has a reason to believe what 
evidence supports, the only tenable answer seems to be that doing so leads, 
rather reliably, to true beliefs. It may be even be the most reliable mechanism 
available to arrive at true beliefs. Contrarily, if believing in accordance with 
the evidence would not be a reliable means to come to true beliefs, there 
would be no reason to believe what the evidence supports. This may be so in 
a quirky world where evidence is often misleading and where there may be 
better means to acquire true beliefs (for instance, testimony, playing dice, 
etc.). It follows that we have a reason to align our beliefs according to our 
evidence only if we have a reason to believe what is true; hence (2*). 
Unfortunately, I cannot rely on this argument in defending (2*). This is 
because I cannot exclude that the ultimate reason for why evidence provides 
us with reasons for believing something is not that this would reliably lead to 
true beliefs, but because it would, for instance, lead to beliefs that are 
justified. Justification may after all be the ultimate aim of a belief. Alterna-
tively, evidence may guide us to beliefs that are (in the relevant sense) bene-
ficial for us. Being beneficial could also be a belief’s ultimate aim. Eviden-
tialism would therefore no longer need to presuppose that we have a reason to 
believe N if N is true; it would therefore no longer support (2*). 
Here is another attempt to defend (2*). One way commonly used to show 
that we have a reason to behave in a certain way is to show that a certain type 
of behaviour is a means to some desired end we have. Perhaps we all have 
some desire, given we ought to behave in a particular way, to believe that we 
ought to behave in this particular way. Perhaps we also believe that a ne-
cessary means to have true beliefs about how we ought to behave is not to 
believe a normative proposition if it is false. This would then give us a reason 
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not to believe that we ought to p if it is not the case that we ought to p, i.e. 
(2*); or so it is argued. 
This argument can be formulated as follows: 
 
(4a) D(O(p) → B(O(p))) 
and  (4b) B((O(p) → B(O(p)))) → (¬O(p) → ¬B(O(p)))) 
So,  (4c) R(¬O(p) → ¬B(O(p))). 
So,  (2*) ¬O(p) → R¬(B(O(p)), 
 
where ‘D’ stands for ‘you desire that’. Unfortunately, this does also not pro-
vide us with a defence of (2*). First, it is not clear that we all share a desire, if 
we ought to p, to believe that we ought to p. Furthermore, not everyone 
believes that in order to believe that you ought to p whenever you ought to p, 
it is necessary not to believe that you ought to p if it is not the case that you 
ought to p. Someone who suffers from server irrationality will perhaps deny 
this. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of the argument, suppose everyone has such a 
desire and such a belief. Would we then have a reason not to believe a false 
normative proposition? I think the answer to this question is ‘no’ for two rea-
sons. First, this argument falls prey to a version Michael Bratman’s 
‘bootstrapping objection’11. A desire and a means-end belief cannot ‘boot-
strap’ a reason into existence. For example, suppose you desire to visit your 
friends, and you, strangely enough, happen to believe that a necessary means 
to do so is to kill your friend. It would be absurd to accept that you now have 
a reason to kill your friend. But even by supposing that you can pull a reason 
out of a contingent desire and a means-end belief, it would not give us the 
truth of (2*). This is because the inference from (4c) to (2*) is not valid. For 
the fact that you have a reason to make a conditional true (as in (4c)) does not 
mean that you have a reason to make true the consequent of this conditional. 
To get a better understanding of why this is so, let us write the conditional in 
(4c) as a disjunction and assume ‘p’ stands for ‘you help your neighbours’. 
Then, (4c) says that you have a reason to [not believe that you help your 
neighbours or you ought to help your neighbours].This is plainly consistent 
with the conjunction that it is not the case that you ought to help your 
neighbours and it is not the case that you have a reason not to believe that 
                                                                            
11  M. BRATMAN’S, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason, pp. 23-7. See also John Broome’s 
‘Are intentions reasons?’. 
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you ought to help your neighbours. However, (2*) is not consistent with this 
conjunction. For if it is not the case that you ought to help your neighbours, 
(2*) implies that you have a reason not to believe that you ought to help your 
neighbours. Consequently, (4c) is consistent with a set of proposition (2*) is 
not consistent with. That is why (4c) cannot imply (2*). 
I think (2*) ultimately needs to be premised on the following argument. 
One aspect of normative beliefs I have so far neglected is their practical cha-
racter. By ‘practical character’ I mean their intimate connection with actions. 
A person free of weakness of the will and other forms of irrationality will end 
up doing what she believes she ought to do12. Suppose you falsely believe 
that you ought to kill yourself. Whilst this belief alone may not be bad in 
itself, its consequences may be disastrous. In fact, given a sufficient degree of 
rationality, you will end up killing yourself, and your normative belief will be 
the cause of it. Without doubt, you have a reason to rid yourself of your belief 
that you ought to kill yourself. In general, you have a teleological reason to 
avoid believing normative falsehoods. 
One may object that this example supports (2*) only because there is a 
strong reason not to do what you believe you ought to do (i.e. to kill 
yourself). This strong reason is what in fact explains why you have a reason 
not to believe that you ought to kill yourself, and not the fact that this belief is 
false. Hence, I need to look at cases where you falsely believe you ought to 
do something, yet there is no reason not to do what you believe you ought to 
do. Such cases are genuinely possible. For example, suppose it is not the case 
that you ought to bend your ring finger, yet you believe that you ought to do 
so. However, there is also no reason not to bend your finger. That is, there is 
no reason to do so but also no reason not to do so. Do you have a reason to 
rid yourself of this ‘normatively neutral’ false normative belief?  
I think there is a reason not to believe ‘normatively neutral’ normative 
falsehoods. It would be uneconomical to clutter our minds with these beliefs; 
they pose, ceteris paribus, a waste of your mental capacity. They take away 
mental resources, and you have a reason not to waste your mental resources. 
Of course, this does not mean that there are not other reasons ‘to waste’ your 
mental resources. For example, it may have beneficial consequence for you or 
others; you may have strong evidence for it; etc. Nevertheless, there still is a 
reason for you not to have this belief.  
                                                                            
12  On this point see, for example, John Broome’s ‘Normative practical reasoning’. 
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One may object to this by saying that this is trivially true for every belief, 
no matter whether true or false, epistemically, morally, or prudentially requi-
red. There is a reason to rid yourself of all of your beliefs because they all 
reduce your mental resources in some way. Cleary, this cannot be so. There is 
no context-independent (as it were) reason to rid ourselves of all our beliefs 
we have; or so it is argued. 
I agree that this may sound incredible. However, I think it is just a plain 
consequence of taking the idea of ‘ought, all things considered’ seriously. 
‘All things considered’ includes every detail that either ‘favours’ or ‘disfa-
vours’ a particular line of action or belief. All I suggest is that the fact that 
believing something reduces you mental resources will play part in this 
weighing process. That it will often play only an insignificant part does not 
damage my argument here.  
As a result, I will accept (2*) as correct. This allows me to proceed with 
my argument as follows. 
Argument continued 
Conjoining (1) and (2*) allows one to derive (5) by a valid inference: 
 
(5) O(p) v R(¬B(O(p))). 
 
(5) says that either you ought to p or you have a reason not to believe you 
ought to p. I take ‘you ought to p’ to imply that ‘you have a reason to p’. This 
is a plain consequence of supposing that there is nothing you ought to do or to 
believe without there being an explanation of why this is so. Hence, (5) 
implies (6). 
(6) R(p) v R(¬B(O(p))). 
(6) says that you have a reason to p or you have a reason not to believe that 
you ought to p. I content that (6) allows us to derive (7). 
(7) R(p v ¬B(O(p))). 
This inference presupposes the validity of the following agglomerations 
principle: if you have a reason to p or you have a reason to q, then you have a 
reason to (p v q). There are two ways to denounce this principle. First, one 
may argue that agglomeration is valid only if the reasons in the original 
disjunction are of the same kind. By ‘of the same kind’ I mean that they are 
both either epistemic, prudential, moral, practical, or etc. Second, one may 
reject this type of agglomeration as such. 
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Some may reject the inference from (6) to (7) for the first reason. (6) may 
be interpreted as having a ‘practical’ reason for an action on the left side of 
the disjunction and an ‘epistemic’ reasons for a belief on its right side. These 
two reasons are thus ‘inagglomerable’, or so it is argued. But I do not think 
this is correct. For, on a first view, both reasons govern propositions. In (6), 
the reason on the left side of the disjunction governs a proposition, namely 
‘p’. Also, the reason on the right side of the disjunction governs a propo-
sition, namely ‘¬B(O(p))’. Both reasons are thus reasons to make true a pro-
position. This suggests that they are both practical in the following sense. 
Both reasons are reasons for actions. The one on the left side of the dis-
junction is a reason for an action that leads to the truth of ‘p’; the one on the 
right side is a reason for a (mental) action that leads to the truth of 
‘¬B(O(p))’. In this sense the two reasons may very well be ‘agglomerable’. 
However, this will not answer those who principally doubt this type of 
agglomeration. One way to be doubtful is to show that this type of agglo-
meration leads to a cognate version of Ross’s paradox in deontic logic13. In 
Ross’s case the situation is the following. Suppose you ought to send a letter. 
Standard deontic logic allows us then to infer that you ought to [send the 
letter or burn the letter]14. Consequently, burning the letter seems to fulfil one 
of your obligations —even though this is (empirically) inconsistent with your 
original obligation. 
A similar result seems obtainable with the agglomeration principle in 
question. Suppose you have a reason to send the letter. Via agglomeration it 
follows that you have a reason to [send it or burn it]. Suppose you burn it. It 
seems by doing so you indeed do something you have a reason for doing, and 
that is an incredible result.  
Note, however, it does not entail that you fulfil any of your obligations, as 
in Ross’s example. You may have undefeated reasons to send the letter, and 
not to burn it. By then burning your letter you clearly fail to do one thing you 
ought to do even though you had a reason for failing to do so. In fact, I think 
we often encounter situations like this. A judge may conclude ‘surely, you 
had a reason to steal the money, but you should not have done it.’; A histo-
rian may argue that ‘Stalin had a reason to transport grain out of the Ukraine 
in 1932, but he ought not to have done so’; etc. There is nothing incredible in 
that we have a reason to behave in a way we ought not to behave in. 
                                                                            
13  Alf Ross, “Imperatives and logic”. 
14  See Risto Hilpinen’s “Deontic logic”. 
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However, there is another way to doubt the correctness of this type of 
agglomeration. Suppose you have a reason to p. Trivially, this implies ‘you 
have a reason to p or a reason not to p’. Agglomeration then gives us ‘you 
have a reason to [p or not-p]’. So, no matter what you do, you will do so-
mething you have a reason for doing. But this seems truly incredible. It is not 
the case that you have a reason to extinguish mankind, or the like. 
I do not think that ‘you have a reason to [p or not-p]’ implies that no 
matter what you do, you do have a reason for doing so. For this to be correct, 
‘you have a reason to [p or not-p]’ would need to entail the conjunction ‘you 
have a reason to p and you have a reason to not-p’. Any semantics that would 
allow this inference would be clearly dubious. It would lead to flat con-
tractions. Suppose you have a reason to [p or q], but you have no reason to p. 
Suppose however that ‘a reason to [p or q]’ implies ‘you have a reason to p 
and you have a reason to q’, and, thus, ‘you have a reason for to p’. Then it 
would be the case that you have a reason to p and you have no reason to p (at 
the same time)15. Consequently, the fact that agglomeration leads us form 
reason to p to a reason to [p or not-p] does not threaten the validity of the 
agglomeration principle. I therefore assume agglomeration to be correct. 
I now come to the end of my argument. The last step of my argument 
leads me to transform the disjunction in (7) into a conditional. This results in 
 
(8) R(B(O(p)) → p). 
 
(8) says that you have a reason to [if you believe you ought to p, then p]. In 
consequence, we indeed have a reason to do what we believe we ought to do. 
We have a reason to satisfy this major requirement of rationality. 
Accordingly, my argument shows that a (significant) part of rationality is 
normative in a particular sense. We have a reason to satisfy one central 
requirement of rationality. But what about the other requirements of rationa-
lity? Does my argument show their normativity too? Perhaps it does. Theore-
tically, my argument may prove that we have a reason to satisfy all requi-
rements of rationality. In fact, this depends on the following reduction. For all 
X and Y, if rationality requires you to [if you X, Y], X implies that you 
believe you ought to Y. If so, it seems that there is a reason for you to satisfy 
all requirements of rationality. Of course, for some requirements this reduc-
tion seems dubious. I suppose rationality requires you to believe p if you 
                                                                            
15  I thank Geoff Ferrari for a very fruitful discussion of the agglomeration principle. 
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believe not not-p. This is just another way of saying that rationality requires 
you not to have contradictory beliefs. It seems incredible that believing not 
not-p implies that you believe that you ought to believe that p. For instance, I 
believe that it is not the case that my car is not parked in my street, but I do 
not believe that I ought to believe that my car is parked in my street. In fact, I 
have no normative belief about my ‘carparking belief’. 
Nonetheless, for some requirements this reduction seems very plausible. 
Surely rationality requires you [if you intend to p and you believe that q is a 
necessary means to p, intend to q]. It seems plausible to suppose that an 
intention to p in conjunction with a belief that q is a necessary means for p 
entails that you believe that you ought to intend to q. For example, Donald 
Davidson’s account of intentions as unconditional or all-out evaluative 
judgements will more or less directly lead to this entailment16. Also, Joseph 
Raz’s denial of instrumental rationality as a separate category of rationality 
presupposed this entailment. Assuming then that this entailment is correct, 
my argument for having a reason to do what we believe we ought to do shows 
also that we have a reason to take the means necessary to our intend ends. It 
may therefore turn out that my argument establishes the normativity of an 
entire bundle of requirements of rationality. 
 
                                                                            
16  See Donald Davidson’s ‘Intending’. Furthermore, in his ‘The myth of instrumental rationality’, 
Jospeh Raz also presupposes this entailment. 
